



Volume XX, Issue 3 (2022)

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Time Pressure

Time is the one commodity we can never have to much of, Time in type, time at home, time to think. Most of these are due to high workloads in high pressure situations. Did you get turned late onto the ILS? Can you run a checklist before the FAF? Are you on fire? (hopefully not), but that sure would limit your available time. We all have some form of time management strategy. For the average person, it will work almost always. In aviation however, time is a fluid concept. Where once you had an hour and a half to plan, now you've got 2 minutes. What you will find below is a selection of reports, where the submitter indicated time pressure as a critical factor. Some are fairly benign, missed radio calls, altitude changes, etc. The common errors we find so often. The opportunity exists for a more serious incident however. Because of this we feel it pertinent (so does the FAA) to highlight the associated hazards. This can all be summed up In the words of John Creasy.



What is

READBACK?

Readback is a publication intended exclusively for PRISM subscribers. The format and source material is modeled after the popular Callback publication from the NASA ASRS system, but is tailored for business aviation operations. Readback takes real-world ASRS incident reports and groups them by common themes. By reading and discussing these situations, we hope to give operators an awareness and sensitivity to real world hazards and risk so they may benefit by the shared experiences of other aviation operations.

Where are we? Who are you? What is the meaning of life?

After exiting [Runway] 25L, Tower cleared us to cross 25R and taxi to [Gate] X via the North Route. We taxied via Taxiway D towards T. While on D, Tower informed us that we should have been on E. I told Tower that our Jepps said to taxi via D then T. While on T, I reviewed the 10-6 page again and realized we complied with the wrong procedures. I switched back to the Tower frequency and informed him of the error, and told him the Jepps lists different routing. Tower thanked us and said it was no big deal and they'd look into the routing instructions. Review all choices on the 10-6 page. Also, each routing on the PHX 10-6 page should be specifically differentiated (North 1,2, or 3). This would virtually eliminate human errors.

Synopsis

Air Carrier First Officer reported a taxiway deviation. The FO stated the chart listed a routing different than as assigned by ATC and suggested a notation for clarity.

Whoever smelt it.....

We were being vectored for the ILS [Runway] XXL in ZZZ. Flight Attendant notified us of odors in the cabin. We did not have odors in the flight deck. We [requested priority handling] and landed immediately. After landing and clearing the runway, I spoke to Flight Attendant who indicated that the odor had dissipated. We then taxied to the gate uneventfully. The flight was met by emergency personnel. No injuries were reported.

Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported being notified by a flight attendant of odors in the cabin during final approach. Flight crew requested and received special handling and continued for a safe landing.



I got it, I got it, I don't got it


On Date conducting a flight from ZZZ to Billings, MT. Well inbound to Billings, ATC advised to stay at 7,000 ft., fly heading 190, and traffic at 12 o'clock 5,500 ft. [We] had the traffic in sight (Aircraft Y, Piper Archer). When roughly 15 miles to the northeast of Billings, the traffic began to climb, but it did not look as though it was on a collision path. So [we] continued at 7,000 ft. and heading 190. The traffic continued to climb and began make a steep turn towards the [our] flight. ATC gave a traffic alert to Aircraft Y and told them to "descend, descend, descend." To avoid a mid-air collision Captain disconnected the autopilot, deviated from the IFR instructions, initiated a climb right turn. During one point the two aircraft were within 300 ft. of each other. Aircraft Y deviated from its assigned altitude. I believe we did take the correct precautions to prevent a mid-air collision. First Officer followed up with the Approach Controller via telephone. The controller said that Aircraft Y deviated from its assigned altitude and that we were not in the wrong. The Controller intends to follow up with the [FBO] to discuss the near-miss.

Synopsis: Captain reported a NMAC with another aircraft and the need for evasive action after the opposing aircraft deviated from their assigned altitude.

Oh look a fire...



Flight from ZZZ to ZZZZ, flying a route down to coast to avoid weather Severe WX. Between ZZZ1 and ZZZZZ Captain did a normal system monitor check. Upon looking at the COND page, he noticed the AFT Cargo Temp at 180 degrees (Steady Green), asked me if I had seen a temp that high, I replied No! We kept an eye on it, over the next 10 minutes, noticed it rising to 188 degrees, then 194 degrees (still Steady Green) where it stayed for the duration of the flight. This



ATC gave a traffic alert to Aircraft Y and told them to "descend, descend, descend."

made us uncomfortable for normal Cargo Bay temperatures in my 3,000+ hours flying this aircraft at 2 different airlines have never exceeded cabin temperatures during cruise. We simultaneously started looking into what could be a catastrophic problem. I got into the QRH AOM/FOM/and other manuals to look for temperature limitations and fixes. I found none, anywhere. During the same time, Captain got on the Phone with Operations and phone patched to Maintenance Control, where they attempted multiple resets to no success. When Captain got off the phone with Maintenance, he said, "Well nothing fixed It, and they (Maintenance) said we are on our own." At that point, we agreed as a crew that we didn't know what was going on down there. We were both not comfortable taking an aircraft with this indication over water, with limited divert options to an international location, and with no company or Contract Maintenance at the destination not knowing what was going on down there. The indication was steady at this point, not rising higher [than] 194 degrees, nor giving any other indications to the back when we notified the Flight Attendants and told them what was going on. At this point, we



felt we were not in a land as soon as possible scenario, but in a land as soon as practical scenario but keeping land as soon as possible options available and we decided to divert to ZZZ2. We gave ATC a PAN PAN call since we were going to a divert airport that wasn't our alternate but that we were not at the time an emergency aircraft, we just wanted to have all our bases covered. We notified Dispatch both via phone patch and ACARS. During descent we were cleared the ZZZZZ Arrival to ZZZ2. We were still grossly overweight with a lot of gas, so we referenced the overweight Checklist. With that, we decided that with the condition still not worsening from what had been continuously indicated with no secondary indications or issues coming from the cabin, Captain and I both agreed that in an effort not to compound the problem we should hold to burn down gas, but having immediate [landing] options nearby, so we held at ZZZZZ1 at 16,000 ft. for 30-40 min and got to a calculated weight that would put us on deck in ZZZ2 right at Max landing weight. We continued to ZZZ2 via the arrival, for an uneventful Runway XX landing. On a side note, the XX transition from the ZZZZZ Arrival is a bit of a slam dunk. We asked for a bit longer final to get down, stabilized, and situated, and ATC approach gave us a few last second altitude, headings, and speed amendments through final which started to task saturate us as we prepared for landing. For example: open descent from 6,000-3,000, we were told to amend altitude and maintain 4,000 ft. while passing 4,200 feet, thrust idle, and speed brakes out. We blew through the altitude and had to climb back up Auto Pilot off, ALT horn blaring, and engines spooling up to 80+%, and getting speed brakes back in. We were also given several headings through final, and were asked to slow to final approach speed 10 plus miles outside the final approach fix at 4,000 feet, and approach didn't give us an approach clearance until we had flown through the glide slope on the localizer, and had to join from above, in order to sequence aircraft landing [Runway] XYL, which started to compound our landing configuration planning, and a go around was not something we were hoping to do, especially off of a PAN PAN call. We later found that on a couple of occurrences, ATC did not pass the PAN PAN or divert info from Center to Center to Approach. We were later reassigned upon arrival to fly a ZZZ3 Turn that left in 5 minutes.



"...ATC did not pass the PAN PAN or divert info from Center to Center to Approach."


I told Company that we just went through a lot, and that if they wanted us to fly that turn, that I needed a break for an amount of time that I was setting, some food, and so the Captain and I went and had a sit down meal, decompressed, talked about what had happened, after an hour or so I assessed my fitness for duty and felt I was good to fly the turn. The Captain and I were sitting on the jet, and when we called for push going to ZZZ3, Ramp told us to hold and that Maintenance wanted to talk to us. The maintenance team member got on the radio, asked if we were the crew that brought Aircraft X in from ZZZ, I replied yes, and he told us we needed to fill out a fume report. Captain asked what he was talking about, and told him this was the first we have heard about any fume incident. The Maintainer on the radio said the Flight Attendants had filed a fume report after the flight, and we needed to do the same. The Flight Attendants never told us anything about fumes nor their intent to fill out any such reports. Captain then filed a fume report said he had no information to give for we knew nothing about it. I felt Captain had communicated very clearly what was going on to the flight attendants about the situation, and our intent to divert. They had never communicated any such issues during any duration of or after the flight. Unknown from the high temperature in the Aft Cargo Bay. We did later saw that Maintenance replaced the sensor in the aft cargo bay via the app. We were curious that with all the ZZZ team members in Training vests if maybe they stacked the bags in the aft cargo bay above the line and possibly covered the sensor or did something to it. However, As far as the "suspected" fume event, there was no communication from the flight attendants to the cockpit crew for this event. We noticed via the app that Maintenance later deferred the APU to prevent "further fume events" due to the suspected fume event we were later notified about from ZZZ2 Maintenance. Not sure why if there is a fume event (or even a suspected fume event) why they don't further investigate the problem or fix the problem, rather than just pencil whip it into deferment. If there was any fumes in this situation, how would MX (Maintenance) know they came from the APU and not from any potential problem we were encountering? Put quick reference limitations on a



Cockpit Card or in the QRH or checklist to quickly reference for situations such as these. I felt like we were on an Easter egg hunt for something that we later found wasn't there which wasted a lot of our decision making time. I know that Airbus FCOM (Flight Crew Operations Manual) and other manufacture manuals/ reference material has such limitations for quick reference from my experience at a previous Airbus airline. Why can't the company get on board with Airbus??? Make sure Flight Attendants communicate to the cockpit if they were smelling fumes.

Synopsis

A321 First Officer reported an abnormally elevated Aft Cargo Bay temperature during cruise. After conferring with maintenance, the flight executed a precautionary diversion for maintenance.



I hear Tenerife is lovely this time of year.....

Narrative: 1


ZZZ Tower Controller cleared us to cross Runway XXL on X. As we crossed Runway XXL the same controller cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff on Runway XXL. The controller then proceeded to give departure sequence updates over the frequency (XXX.X). We transmitted we were on the runway. Aircraft Y was finally able to tell the controller he saw us and was holding position. The controller then stated to Aircraft Y that he had indeed cleared us to cross XXL and that he had made a mistake.

Narrative: 2

The flight was scheduled as an afternoon turn to ZZZ1-ZZZ-ZZZ1. I was the First Officer and was the pilot flying to ZZZ--this event occurred on the ground during the taxi to the ZZZ ramp. After landing on XXR (approx XA10), ZZZ Tower instructed to roll to the end, taxi left on Taxiway Z, Y, X--hold short of XXL at X, and to monitor Tower XXX.X. After several departures, we were cleared to taxi to the ramp via X, cleared to cross XXL at X, and notified traffic will be holding in position. At approximately the time our nose gear crossed the centerline of the runway, ZZZ Tower cleared Aircraft Y to takeoff and was immediately acknowledged by the Aircraft Y crew. Recognizing we were not going to be clear, I tried to notify Tower that we were still on the runway--I don't think he heard my call, he was giving a takeoff sequence to several aircraft awaiting takeoff. After ZZZ Tower finished reading the sequence, Aircraft Y told the controller that he cleared them for takeoff while "Aircraft X was still on the runway". The Tower controller acknowledged the mistake and re-cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff.

Synopsis

Air Carrier flight crew reported they were cleared to cross the runway by Tower. As this was occurring, another airliner was cleared for takeoff on the same runway by the same controller. The other airliner alerted the controller to the conflict.





I double checked, we don't know.....

Narrative: 1

We did the appropriate paperwork and prepared to depart ZZZ for ZZZ1. Picked up our clearance and departed. At some point in the climb we became aware of an odor distinctly that of gasoline. After discussing the notable lack of HAZMAT paperwork and the implications of such an odor we made the decision to turn around. Re-briefed the approach and our plan, called ZZZ Center and requested direct to the IAF for the ILS which we then performed as normal. After arriving back at the airport we opened the cargo door to inspect the cargo and locate the culprit. Upon doing so we discovered a shipment of gas cans (Jerry Jugs) that had not been cleaned properly. We removed them, searched the rest of the load for anything else that we should have been notified of its presence, removed what we could find, and redid the weight and balance. Filed a new flight plan, and departed once more for ZZZ1. The rest of the flight went without incident. A company mandated return report was filed with the appropriate operational personnel.

Narrative: 2

I was the FO on Flight X. We arrived into ZZZ to get loaded. The Captain informed me we were picking up camera equipment that was a cargo charter. The ground crew loaded our plane and supplied the Captain where each [component] weight was located. He did a weight and balance and I checked his math and also agreed we were within CG. They did not supply us anything that showed Hazmat paperwork. However, I didn't know that at the time. I went and gathered the cones and when I went to grab the tail stand I noticed it was 1/2 inch off the ground which I have never seen. I notified the Captain on the aft weight being heavy and told him he should come look. He declined to come inspect the weight aft that was weighing down the tail stand but he checked the paperwork and said we would be OK. I did notice some gas cans which I believed to be brand new at the rear of the cargo area. I also noticed numerous large propane tanks. At this point I assumed the Capt knew about it. As we departed and were climbing out I started smelling a strong odor of gasoline. We were still in a critical phase of flight climbing out on our departure procedure. ATC cleared us direct ZZZZZ once 6000 feet. As we climb through 6000 feet clear of all obstacles I entered direct ZZZZZ in the GPS and then told the Captain I smelled a very strong odor of gasoline. He explained he did as well. We kept climbing trying to decide what was the odor exactly. I told him about the cans and propane tanks and asked if he knew if we had Hazmat onboard. He explained he was not told or given any Hazmat paperwork. We turned the blowers off as I was getting light headed from the fumes. I told the Captain I felt it was urgent we return to ZZZ or land at the nearest airport ZZZ2 to check the safety of our load and determine the odor. After a brief discussion the Captain agreed and we made the decision to return to ZZZ because there we had a better way of inspecting and checking for paperwork. The Captain notified ATC we needed to turn back to ZZZ due to odor coming from our cargo. We did our decent approach checklist after picking up current weather and started our approach into ZZZ. We landed safely in ZZZ. I got out and put the tail stand in immediately. When the Captain exited the aircraft the plane fell on to the stand. I told the Captain I was not leaving in that airplane until we got the load figured out and the weight and Balance was corrected. We went through and found approximately 10 gas cans that contained some gasoline left inside, flares, ammunition, bear spray, 100 small propane tanks, and 8 large propane tanks. None of them were on the manifest we were given. We removed those items. The Captain got a flashlight and went through most of the entire load. The Captain redistributed the weight making our plane safely within the CG limits. We left ZZZ without



any Hazmat onboard to our knowledge and we were well within CG. I learned a valuable lesson in this. I will never assume the Captain knows what is inside the aircraft. When I ask a Captain to come look at the CG I will not start the flight until that Captain comes and we as a team can determine our aircraft is loaded how the loaders told us and we are not carrying Hazmat materials unaware to us. It was flooding rain. The Captain and I both trusted the plane was loaded the way and with the contents the loader told us. We were delayed in a few other places and allowed the pressure of getting the cargo to ZZZ3 and the fact we were pushing our time to rush us. Once the Captain and myself discovered all these discrepancies we both slowed down, ensured the load was legal. We notified Dispatch while flying back we would not be making it to ZZZ3 as planned. We both were not going to have enough hours and both of us were fatigued. Once we realized the issue we made the right decisions to make it safe. I learned a valuable lesson from this incident and the Captain explained he did as well.

Synopsis


Air Carrier flight crew reported undocumented Hazmat cargo loaded in cargo compartment without any required documentation provided to the flight crew. A communication breakdown between Captain and First Officer exacerbated the situation resulting in a safe precautionary air return to correct Hazmat violation and weight and balance errors.

Doors to manual and UH OH !...

Aircraft X flew from ZZZ to ZZZZ. Subsequent flight from ZZZZ to ZZZ, local time XA:12, jet bridge's canopy retracted and interfered the L1 door. Approximately 1 hour 30 minutes after the incident, Maintenance was notified after a Contract Maintenance accomplished the inspection and operational check of the L1 door in accordance with AMM XX-XX-XX, FORWARD ENTRY DOOR INSPEC-



TION/CHECK. Per Contract Maintenance's statement, no door malfunctions noted and cockpit indications are good and no dent or fuselage damage noted. I was fixated on door operation and visual inspection only due to extensive maintenance delay without Maintenance knowing. As a result, I failed to advise the Contract Maintenance to perform further investigation, as per given AMM task "GROUND HANDLING EQUIPMENT HITS AIRPLANE OR PART DEPARTS AIRPLANE" AMM task XX-XX-XY. Based on contractor's finding, I released the plane so it flew subsequent flight to ZZZ. However, once Aircraft X arrived to ZZZ, the abnormal door movement was noted by Gate Agent, and ZZZ Maintenance found damage in the upper hinge on L1 door. After 6 days, I noticed I forgot to ask contractor to perform "GROUND HANDLING EQUIPMENT HITS AIRPLANE" AMM task. I felt pressure on time as customers are already boarded while I was communicating with the Contract Maintenance. Maintenance should be the first point of contact, as Maintenance related discrepancy or aircraft damage occurred, so the event information could be shared among the Maintenance Control department. Therefore, it possibly creates redundancy while minimizing delays.



"...found damage in the upper hinge on L1 door."


Synopsis

Maintenance Controller reported not advising Contract Maintenance to perform several additional inspections after a jet bridge canopy struck the L1 Door. It was later determined that the L1 Door had sustained damage. The aircraft was removed from service for repair.

I don't always fly blind, but when I do.....

Narrative: 1


During visual approach to XXL, First Officer (FO) was pilot flying (PF) and I was pilot monitoring (PM). Both pilots were unfamiliar with simultaneous visual approach procedures into ZZZ1. We were cleared on the visual following traffic to the parallel. Due to heavy glare and haze, FO was unable to maintain visual with the runway and I opted to take controls since I could see the runway and traffic to follow. ATC had assigned a speed without specifying when to slow or when to contact Tower and we crossed the FAF at 170 kts. In the ensuing rush to contact Tower, finish configuring and run the before landing checklist, we ended up making our stabilized call at 500 ft. After touchdown and before rolling through XXR, I heard Tower clear an aircraft for takeoff on XXR and I came to a rapid stop short of XXR. Neither pilot had heard an ATC clearance to land and hold short of any runway or taxiway. We cleared the Runway at Taxiway 1 and taxied to the gate without further incident. Task saturation and tunnel vision led me to fail to call for or execute a go around when it was clearly called for. Unfamiliarity with the visual approach procedures at ZZZ1 and a long duty day were contributing factors to poor decision making and situational awareness. More detailed information on unique procedures into large airports to ensure pilot familiarity, better fatigue mitigation and a continued emphasis on executing a go around when an approach becomes unstable.



Narrative: 2

After almost a 5 hour maintenance delay at ZZZ2, an integrated drive generator was deferred and we completed one of the two legs that were originally on our schedule before timing out. I was pilot flying (PF) this leg and elected not to brief the arrival into ZZZ1 on the ground due to lots of variables and abnormal for compliance with the MEL on the departure briefing. In the climb-out, I called for Autopilot on to start looking at the arrival and complete a brief then. Both the Captain and I were unfamiliar with ZZZ1. Once we reached cruise, we immediately got a descend via clearance on the ZZZZZ 4 arrival. I had not briefed yet because we were discussing the Visual as we were told to expect that. Being unfamiliar with this, we did not know how to correctly program the FMS. We spent a lot of time trying to figure this out while we were descending down. I eventually briefed the visual backed up with the ILS XXL as I normally would for a visual and briefed a threat to be the Visual procedure as we weren't sure what to expect or how that would go. Descent check was called for at about 13,000 ft.

We ultimately ended up high and fast to join the intercept course to the XXL LOC. ATC asked a few times if we had the airport in sight, but it was evening and the sun was setting right in the direction the airport was. There was also a haze layer creating visual illusions and I could not find the runway. As we got closer, I could tell we were getting high and fast and needed to accept the visual to get configured and on glide path. The captain saw the runway and called it in sight and we attempted to slow and get set up. ATC had us at 210 kts. and 5000 ft., then eventually gave us 180 kts. or greater. We went flaps 8/20 and gear down with full boards to lose altitude. I still did not have the airport in sight looking right into the sun so we swapped controls and I transitioned to pilot monitoring (PM). ATC never handed us off to Tower so once inside the FAF we got fully configured by going flaps 30/45 in one call, and never completed the correct calls for check spoilers, flaps 45 before landing check. As flaps were in transit to 45, I called Tower for landing clearance. During their read back, we got a FLT SPOILER DEPLOY caution and retracted the spoilers. I read back landing clearance and we continued to land. During the roll-out, it appears Tower cleared someone on XR to takeoff before we crossed that intersection. Unsure if we missed a land and hold short clearance, the captain used the breaks to stop before the XR intersection. Tower proceeded to clear traffic to land behind us on XXL, give an aircraft a line up and wait clearance for XXL while we are stopped on the runway with no further instruction. We elected to taxi off and wait for further instructions, and the remainder of the taxi-in was uneventful. Both the captain and I were unfamiliar with ZZZ1, their arrivals and charted visuals. Fatigue definitely played a role as this was already into our 2 hour extension period from a reflow on a 13.5 hour duty day. The short flight was a threat and did not give us enough time to brief and prepare for the visual. Neither of us were fully clear on the procedures involved with the charted visuals and how the FMS should be set up/used. ATC was nearly pressuring us to report the airport in sight so they could clear us for the visual. At the time, accepting the visual seemed like the only way to get in a position to be stabilized on the approach course because ATC did not give us vectors or lower altitudes to help put us in position. The sun was setting and was shining right at us, and combined with the haze, it was very difficult to find the airport having not been familiar with the area. From the very beginning, we could have asked for delay vectors on the arrival to get caught up and try to understand the charted visual procedures. Then coming in closer, we could have asked for a slower speed to help create time and get configured with at least flaps 8 and 20. Without having the airport in sight, we also could have asked for the ILS but it seemed that everyone else was getting in with the visual so ATC kept asking if we had the airport in sight so they could send us on our way. Once cleared for the visual, it was apparent we were not in a good position but ATC cleared us anyway and we tried to make it work. At this point, it got really



“we should have broken off the approach and came back around. We were not stabilized by 1000 ft”



hectic and busy, we should have broken off the approach and came back around. We were not stabilized by 1000 ft. which should have been a mandatory go-around. I don't think I ever once considered doing a go-around because of task saturation and tunnel vision to keep the aircraft under control and clear of parallel traffic. I could have also asked the Tower Controller to say again with the landing clearance. Going back to liveATC, it appears the Tower Controller cleared some-

one to line up and wait on XXR and he told us that there was traffic in position and holding on the intersecting runway, current winds and cleared to land. The only part I heard was the landing clearance, but I was aware he said more. I just did not hear the other parts of the transmission due to the caution coming on at the same time. A little more direction/assistance from ATC would have helped tremendously, but they probably had no way of knowing we were unfamiliar with these procedures. It would also be helpful to have information on our company charts about these procedures, especially since ZZZ3 based crews rarely go to this area. Bottom line, we should have gone around at the latest at 1000 ft. when we were not stabilized.

Synopsis

CRJ200 flight crew reported multiple issues resulted in an unstable approach that would have required a go around. Instead, the crew continued the landing and were stable by 500 ft AGL.

Would you quit your pitching?...


During a normal take off roll after liftoff at 95 kts., the gear and flaps retracted. At 115 kts. 150 ft. the nose started an uncommanded pitch up. I took the trim from the takeoff setting and trimmed to the full nose down position with no response from the increasing nose up pitch event. At this time I had roll and yaw control however pitch control felt like a servo was holding the yoke in the pitch axis. With the airspeed decreasing below 85 kts. a




90 degree roll was initiated to get the nose down which allowed airspeed to increase. Once the airspeed increased a secondary roll to 90 degrees of bank was initiated to counter the continuing pitch tendency. On the second pitch event the yoke starting to allow limited movement with mechanical feel of a servo driving pitch. Roll and yaw were free though out the whole event. Once the auto pilot circuit breaker was pulled the pitch axis returned to normal. Throughout the event the auto pilot disconnected button had been pressed several times with no effect. My communication was very limited with ATC throughout the event until the aircraft control was regained. However ATC had full view of the event from the Tower and was very proactive and clearing the air space. Landing was normal no damage to air frame. A weight and balance was performed prior to flight and aircraft was well within Center of Gravity. Preflight control check was performed with no anomalies. The auto pilot flight director was used for takeoff with the auto pilot not engaged.

Synopsis

CE-441 pilot reported during initial climbout the aircraft made two uncommanded pitch ups with the autopilot not engaged. The pilot regained control by pulling the autopilot circuit breaker and was able to land the aircraft normally.



“My communication was very limited with ATC throughout the event...”



Pressure

- Time pressure does contribute to accidents.
- Tight scheduling allows no margin of safety.

By: The FAA, Safety Team

About ASRS

<http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov>

Summary

The ASRS is a small but important facet of the continuing effort by government, industry, and individuals to maintain and improve aviation safety. The ASRS collects voluntarily submitted aviation safety incident/situation reports from pilots, controllers, and others.

The ASRS acts on the information these reports contain. It identifies system deficiencies, and issues alerting messages to persons in a position to correct them. It educates through its newsletter CALLBACK, its journal ASRS Directive and through its research studies. Its database is a public repository which serves the FAA and NASA's needs and those of other organizations world-wide which are engaged in research and the promotion of safe flight.

Purpose

The ASRS collects, analyzes, and responds to voluntarily submitted aviation safety incident reports in order to lessen the likelihood of aviation accidents.

ASRS data are used to:

- ⇒ Identify deficiencies and discrepancies in the National Aviation System (NAS) so that these can be remedied by appropriate authorities.
- ⇒ Support policy formulation and planning for, and improvements to, the NAS.
- ⇒ Strengthen the foundation of aviation human factors safety research. This is particularly important since it is generally conceded that over two-thirds of all aviation accidents and incidents have their roots in human performance errors.